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No New Tax Cuts?
Examining the Rescue Plan's New State Tax Limits
by Conor Clarke and Edward Fox
indirectly offset a reduction in the net tax
revenue of such State . . . resulting from a
change in law, regulation, or
administrative interpretation during the
covered period that reduces any tax (by
providing for a reduction in a rate, a
rebate, a deduction, a credit, or
otherwise) or delays the imposition of
3
any tax or tax increase.

Conor Clarke is an attorney in the Justice
Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, and
Edward Fox is an assistant professor of law at
the University of Michigan Law School.
In this article, Clarke and Fox examine the
American Rescue Plan Act’s restrictions on state
tax cuts, arguing that the restrictions are a
variation on more familiar maintenance-ofeffort provisions. These provisions are common
and are designed to help ensure that federal
grants supplement rather than supplant state
spending by requiring the state to maintain its
level of spending on a program. They conclude
that the ARPA’s requirements are consonant
with the Constitution’s spending clause.
This article represents solely the views of the
authors, not those of the Office of Legal Counsel
or the Department of Justice.
Copyright 2022 Conor Clarke and Edward Fox.
All rights reserved.
The American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA),
enacted in March 2021, allocated $195 billion to
state governments to help them respond to the
COVID-19 pandemic, with funds remaining
1
available until 2024. The funding provisions give
states broad latitude in how to spend the money
to combat the virus and the economic turmoil left
2
in its wake. But that discretion is limited in one
respect that has proved controversial: The funds
cannot be used to “directly or indirectly offset”
state tax cuts. The relevant language says:
A State . . . shall not use the funds
provided . . . to either directly or

The reaction to this section — alternatively
described as the tax mandate or offset provision,
and which we will call the tax provision — has
been fierce. Soon after enactment, the attorneys
general of several Republican-led states wrote
that an aggressive interpretation of the provision
“would represent the greatest attempted
invasion of state sovereignty by Congress in the
4
history of our Republic.” Ohio filed suit for a
preliminary injunction against the tax provision,
contending that it exceeded Congress’s power
under the Constitution’s spending clause. Ohio
argued that the tax provision “gives the States a
choice: they can have either the badly needed
federal funds or their sovereign authority to set
state tax policy.” Ohio continued, “In our current
economic crisis, that is no choice at all,” but is
5
instead “a metaphorical ‘gun to the head.’”
6
Several other states quickly filed similar suits,
which “emerged as the Biden administration’s
3

ARPA section 9901(c)(2) (codified at 42 U.S.C. section 802(c)(2)).

4

See Letter to Janet L. Yellen, secretary of the U.S. Department of the
Treasury, from State Attorneys General, “Re: Treasury Action to Prevent
Unconstitutional Restriction on State’s Fiscal Policy Through American
Rescue Plan Act of 2021,” Mar. 16, 2021.
5

1

See American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-2, 135 Stat. 4,
223 (codified at 42 U.S.C. section 801 et seq.).
2

See 42 U.S.C. section 802(c)(1)(a)-(d).

“Combined Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum
in Support of the Motion,” at 1, Ohio, v. Yellen, 2021 WL 1624920 (S.D.
Ohio 2021).
6

See West Virginia v. Yellen, No. 7:21-cv-00465 (N.D. Ala. 2021); Texas v.
Yellen, No. 2:21-cv-00079 (N.D. Tex. 2021); Kentucky v. Yellen, No. 3:21-cv00017 (E.D. Ky. 2021).
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first major legal battle.” Many of these lawsuits
are now on appeal.
Our purpose in this article is not to
comprehensively evaluate the merits of these
suits. Instead, we seek to explain and
contextualize the tax provision. We have several
related observations — observations that make
the tax provision more likely to be consistent
with the spending clause and hardly
unprecedented from the perspective of existing
policy.
First, in key respects, the tax provision, as
8
implemented in Treasury’s recent rule, is a
variation of a familiar animal: a maintenance-ofeffort (MOE) provision. These provisions —
which are designed with the sensible goal of
helping to ensure that federal spending
“supplements and not supplants” state spending
— are common, with scores of examples
scattered across numerous titles of the U.S.
9
Code. MOE provisions usually take the form of
a condition attached to new federal grants for,
say, higher education, and require that the state
spend at least as much of its own funds on higher
education going forward as it did in a base year,
10
or face losing the new funds. Although money
is fungible, these provisions encourage states to
not slash their own education budgets or use
11
federal funds for non-education purposes. With
ARPA’s tax provision, the twist is that the MOE
incentive applies at a higher level of generality —
broader than the level of a specific program, and
only in areas where the state uses the funds. As
we explain below, the tax provision thus offers
states greater flexibility compared with
traditional MOE provisions because the state
may shift its own spending (and indeed federal

7

Alan Rappeport, “Biden Administration Faces Legal Fight Over
State Aid Restrictions on Tax Cuts,” The New York Times, Mar. 17, 2021.
8

See “Coronavirus State and Local Fiscal Recovery Funds,” 87 Fed.
Reg. 4,338 (Jan. 27, 2022).
9

For examples of the many provisions in which Congress has
required MOE (or empowered a federal agency to do the same), see 20
U.S.C. section 9133(c); 23 U.S.C. section 405(a)(9); 29 U.S.C. section
3331(b); 42 U.S.C. section 300d-73(f); 49 U.S.C. section 31102(f). For a
discussion of MOE with additional examples, see Government
Accountability Office, Principles of Federal Appropriations Law, vol. 2, 10102 to 10-106 (2006).
10

See 20 U.S.C. section 1015.

11

As we discuss below, the fungibility of money means MOE
provisions cannot always ensure that federal grants do not supplant
state spending on an activity.

© 2022 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.

PRACTICE & ANALYSIS

funds) across covered activities. In theory, there
can be tradeoffs — not all of which are present in
this case — between broader MOE provisions
and conventional, program-specific MOE
provisions. But because of the inextricable link
between state revenue and spending, we find
that traditional MOE provisions put at least as
much pressure on state tax policy as the tax
provision. If a state wants to cut taxes — and
wants to do so in part by reducing its spending
in a program covered by a traditional MOE
provision — it will lose federal grants, usually
dollar for dollar.
Second, and more generally, we argue that it
is not unprecedented for the federal government
to reduce its spending on a state if the state cuts
its taxes, as would happen for offsets under the
tax provision. This already occurs indirectly
through the state and local tax deduction: When
state and local taxes are deductible at the federal
level, states have more of an incentive to
maintain or increase taxes than they otherwise
would. Put differently, when a state or locality
cuts its taxes by $1, usually less than $1 ends up
in the hands of its residents because the cut also
reduces the residents’ potential federal income
tax deduction for state and local taxes by $1.
More directly, there is a close parallel between
the tax provision and the State and Local Fiscal
Assistance Act of 1972, which for over a decade
gave states grants based in part on their tax
effort, which was defined as the total state and
local taxes divided by total state income. In other
words, when states cut their taxes, their fiscal
assistance grants fell. Moreover, the magnitude
of federal funds at stake under both the 1972 act
and the state and local deduction is comparable
to state and local assistance under ARPA. These
comparisons suggest that there has long been a
complicated interplay between federal law and
state tax incentives — with large federal policies
often applying pressure on state taxes — that is
not captured by broad and simple claims of a
strict separation between the state and federal
levels.
ARPA and Treasury’s Rulemaking
ARPA is a $1.9 trillion piece of legislation
with dozens of individual programs spread
across hundreds of pages. The programs include
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an extension of supplemental unemployment
benefits, tax rebates of up to $1,400 for
individuals, and an expansion of the child tax
12
credit. One of the most significant ARPA
provisions was to give directly to state and local
governments through two fiscal relief funds —
new sections 602 and 603 of the Social Security
Act — administered by Treasury. Section 602
creates a nearly $220 billion fund for states,
territories, tribal governments, and the District
of Columbia; section 603 creates a more than
$130 billion fund for local government entities.
Most federal grant programs are program or
area specific, but the ARPA state and local funds
dispense federal money with unusually broad
limits. The contrast can be seen in ARPA itself.
Elsewhere in the act, for instance, Congress
created a large variety of program-specific grant
schemes, including to support midsized food
processors and distributors, rural healthcare,
socially disadvantaged farmers, and the
13
supplemental nutrition assistance program.
ARPA’s state and local funds, by contrast, are
limited only to broad eligible-use categories.
Funds must be used:
• “to respond to the [COVID-19] public
health emergency . . . or its negative
economic impacts;”
• “to respond to workers performing
essential work” during the emergency;
• “for the provision of government services
to the extent of the reduction in revenue” of
the political entity as compared with the
last fiscal year before the COVID-19
emergency; or
• “to make necessary investments in water,
sewer, or broadband infrastructure.”
Should the recipient use the funds outside
these categories, the Treasury secretary may
withhold future funds or recoup them to the
14
extent of the violation. But only the funding for
states and territories contains the tax provision
— reportedly inserted at the behest of Sen. Joe
Manchin III, D-W.Va., in response to Republican
12

ARPA sections 9022, 9601, 9611.

13

See ARPA sections 1001, 1002, 1006, 1101.

14

See 42 U.S.C. section 802(e). Both the state and local funds contain a
restriction forbidding deposits into pension funds. See id. sections
802(c)(2)(B), 803(c)(2).
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Gov. Jim Justice’s proposal to phase out West
Virginia’s income tax15 — that has produced
recent controversy and litigation.
On May 17, 2021, Treasury published an
interim rule implementing (among other things)
the funding provisions of sections 602 and 603,
and on January 6 it published a final rule,
16
effective April 1. Both the interim and final rule
describe the “eligible use” provisions of 602(c)(1)
and 603(1) and include examples of eligible uses
that count as responses “to the public health
emergency . . . or its negative economic impacts.”
Treasury implemented the tax provision by
outlining an annual reporting process by which
states calculate whether they have used ARPA
funds to offset a tax cut.17 First, states must
identify planned changes in law that will
(according to their own scoring methods) reduce
tax revenue; those changes only matter if they
exceed a de minimis safe-harbor level. Next,
states calculate the amount of tax revenue
recorded in the year for which they are
reporting. Finally, if the revenue recorded is less
than the amount of revenue recorded in the fiscal
year ending in 2019 (adjusted for inflation),
states may identify other state law changes that
permissibly offset the shortfall between the value
of the tax cuts they reported at the first step and
any other general revenue growth. These
permissible offsets are state tax increases and
spending cuts if the cuts are not in areas in which
the state is using its section 602 ARPA funds.18
In other words, under the tax provision, a
state may cut taxes without any recoupment if it
has sufficient offsetting revenue growth relative
to fiscal year 2019 or has made offsetting
spending cuts outside the areas in which it
spends the section 602 funds. The tax provision
will thus generally bite only when a state cuts
both taxes and its own spending in areas where

15

Rappeport, “A Last-Minute Add to Stimulus Bill Could Restrict
State Tax Cuts,” The New York Times, Mar. 12, 2021.
16

“Coronavirus State and Local Fiscal Recovery Funds; Interim Final
Rule,” 86 Fed. Reg. 26786 (May 17, 2021); “Coronavirus State and Local
Fiscal Recovery Funds,” 87 Fed. Reg. 4,338 (Jan. 6, 2022).
17

See 87 Fed. Reg. at 4,423. For convenience, we refer to states rather
than states and territories even though these provisions of the rule cover
both.
18

See id. (describing “spending cuts in areas not being replaced by
[state and local fiscal recovery] funds” as a source that may be used to
“permissibly offset the total value of covered tax changes”).
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it also spends section 602 funds. As we explain
in the next section, in practice this means that the
tax provision is broadly analogous to a familiar
MOE provision that treats the areas in which a
state spends section 602 funds as a single
program.
Comparing Section 602(c)(2) and
Traditional MOE Provisions
Suppose a state spends $10 million a year on
higher education, and the federal government
wants to encourage the state to spend $1 million
more. The fungibility of money makes it
impossible for the federal government to ensure
that a $1 million grant given to the state for
higher education will in fact achieve this
purpose. The state may simply take the federal
funds and reduce its own spending by an
equivalent amount, and total education
spending will remain $10 million. To avoid this
common difficultly, the federal government does
not typically rely on the flypaper effect or
attempt to quixotically trace fungible grant
20
dollars. Instead, it frequently uses MOE
provisions to help ensure that federal funds
achieve their intended purpose. In the simple
education hypothetical described above, an
MOE provision might require the state to
maintain its own spending on higher education
compared with a base year or forfeit grants equal
to a spending shortfall. “Maintenance of effort”
as a term of art has appeared in the U.S. Code
more than 100 times, and usually takes the basic

© 2022 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.
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form described. Matching fund requirements —
which are likewise common in the code — work
22
similarly.
When a state accepts federal funds that have
an MOE provision, it discourages state tax cuts,
just as it puts some pressure on the state to
maintain spending. State spending and tax
revenue are inextricably linked. (We generally
assume in our analysis that states are required to
balance their budgets, and thus that spending and
23
revenue are the same.) In the education example,
for instance, if the state would prefer to spend the
$1 million federal education grant on the state
police, it cannot do so without giving up the funds
— which would happen if it used the federal
dollars for state police or reduced its own higher
education funding below the $10 million baseline.
But the state can reshuffle taxes and spending
outside higher education without consequence: It
can add funding to the state police by reducing
non-education spending or by increasing taxes.
Likewise, if the state would prefer to use the $1
million in federal education spending to reduce
state taxes, it cannot do so without giving up the
funds — though the state can still reduce
spending outside higher education to cut taxes
without consequence. As a result, every binding
MOE provision reduces the attractiveness of state
tax cuts by reducing the attractiveness of
spending cuts. The state can only cut taxes by
reducing spending outside the MOE-covered
activity or giving up the federal grant money.24

21

Westlaw Search (Mar. 15, 2022).

22

There are over 300 uses of matching funds in the U.S. code. Under a
matching funds regime, if the state reduces its spending on the matched
activity, it loses federal grant dollars. Likewise, under an MOE provision,
if the state fails to spend up to the threshold, it loses federal spending
equal to the shortfall of its MOE threshold. Thus 1:1 matching grant
programs look like MOE programs, except that usually under MOE
provisions the state cannot increase the federal grant by spending more
than the status quo.
23

19

Assuming a state must strictly balance its budget, if a state cuts its
tax revenue and does not cut its own spending in areas in which it uses
602 funds, then it must have made enough spending cuts outside the 602
areas to avoid recoupment under the tax provision.
20

For the flypaper effect, see, e.g., James R. Hines and Richard H.
Thaler, “The Flypaper Effect,” 9 J. Econ. Persp. 217 (1995); Zachary
Liscow, “Are Court Orders Sticky? Evidence on Distributional Impacts
From School Finance Litigation,” 15 J. Empirical L. Stud. 4 (2018). Many
papers document the tendency of jurisdictions to use money nominally
allocated for a purpose to increase spending for that purpose. Hence the
money sticks where it lands, like on flypaper. Despite the fungibility of
money, income tax law often attempts to attribute the use of money
using various tracing rules. See section 163; 26 CFR section 1.163-8T.

According to the Tax Policy Center, only two states had no
balanced budget requirements as of 2015. See Urban-Brookings Tax
Policy Center, “What Are State Balanced Budget Requirements and How
Do They Work?”
24

MOEs do not always bind, however. If circumstances shift in a way
that would make the state want to spend more than $10 million of its
own funds on higher education absent the federal grant — for example, the
state economy improves and state tax revenues increase, or the state’s
priorities simply change — the MOE provision no longer meaningfully
binds the state. In practice, because money is fungible, the state can now
use some of the grant money to, say, fund the state police, or cut taxes, or
something else. The state will rely on the grant to provide the additional
higher education spending, then use the new money that would have
gone into education (absent the grant) to fund the police or cut taxes.
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Historically, we have found no evidence that
this familiar legislative mechanism has created
controversy under the spending clause. Nor is it
obvious why these provisions would. The
spending clause gives Congress broad power to
create spending programs that pursue the general
welfare, including attaching conditions to federal
funds accepted by states and local governments.
Under long-standing Supreme Court precedent,
conditions on federal funds are constitutional if
they relate to the purpose of the spending, are
25
clearly stated, and are not unduly coercive. So
long as MOE provisions require maintenance in
the federally subsidized areas — reflecting the
federal purpose of supplementing rather than
supplanting local spending — they should satisfy
these general requirements, a fact we see reflected
26
in the limited case law on the subject.
Does the sheer size of the ARPA program
matter? We think probably not. In its most
relevant spending clause precedents, the Supreme
Court has looked to both the size and preexisting
nature of federal spending in deciding whether a
program is unduly coercive in violation of the
spending clause, while emphasizing that the
federal government retains significant latitude in
27
attaching conditions to the use of new funds.
With preexisting funds distributed to the states,
the federal government has created a kind of
understandable reliance interest. But for funds
that are new — and in which the states do not
have an established reliance interest — it would
be anomalous to craft a constitutional doctrine
that reduces the federal government’s authority as
the size of the program increases. Such a doctrine
would suggest, paradoxically, that the largest
federal programs are the ones over which the
federal government should have the least

25

See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).

26

See, e.g., Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1197 (10th Cir. 2000);
see also Mayhew v. Burwell, 772 F.3d 80, 96 (1st Cir. 2014) (upholding an
MOE relating to Medicaid provisions).
27

See National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S.
519, 585 (2012) (“Nothing in our opinion precludes Congress from
offering funds under the Affordable Care Act to expand the availability
of health care, and requiring that States accepting such funds comply
with the conditions on their use. What Congress is not free to do is to
penalize States that choose not to participate in that new program by
taking away their existing Medicaid funding.”).
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control. Also, as we note below, the size of the
ARPA program is of the same order as previous
federal programs that applied a similar amount of
pressure on state taxation — suggesting that
ARPA’s size, distributed over the course of several
years, is no anomaly.
Moreover, in contrast to the baseline MOE
provision sketched above, ARPA gives states even
wider discretion in how to use the funds allocated
in section 602. It is worth comparing the ARPA
funds to a system in which Congress provided
activity-by-activity MOE provisions for the kinds
of uses outlined in section 602(c)(1) — $X for
vaccination programs, $Y for essential workers,
$Z for infrastructure projects, and so forth —
conditional on states maintaining their existing
spending in each category. In such a case, if a state
wanted to put the $X earmarked for vaccination
programs toward essential workers, it would be
unable do so, nor could it cut its own vaccination
funding below the baseline without losing grant
money. Given the breadth of effects from the
pandemic, a set of activity-by-activity MOEs
covering pandemic responses could well have
29
locked in a large fraction of state budgets.
By contrast, section 602 gives states
considerably more choice over how to spend in
the ARPA-covered categories and how to allocate
federal subsidies, because states are free to
reallocate funding under the broad ARPA
umbrella — or simply not use the federal funds in
a particular area. As implemented by Treasury,
the tax provision acts as a kind of MOE provision

28

See Samuel R. Bagenstos, “The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the
Spending Clause After NFIB,” 101 Geo. L.J. 861, 876 (2013) (“A too-big-torefuse principle would lead to the perverse conclusion that the more
generous the terms offered to a state — and thus the more that a state
could extract from Congress to agree to its conditions — the more likely
a condition would be found to violate the state’s right to be free from
coercion.”). Notwithstanding the paradoxical features of a too-big-torefuse principle, the four dissenting justices in NFIB suggested some
openness to this view. See 567 U.S. at 683 (Scalia., J., dissenting) (“The
sheer size of this federal spending program in relation to state
expenditures means that a State would be very hard pressed to
compensate for the loss of federal funds by cutting other spending or
raising additional revenue.”).
29

The largest types of direct state and local expenditures are
healthcare spending (and related types of public welfare spending),
education spending, and spending on highways and roads. See the
Urban Institute, “State and Local Expenditures.” In ARPA, Congress
included an MOE provision in its allocation of grants for elementary,
secondary, and higher education — see section 2004 — though in that
case the baseline takes the form of a percentage of total spending rather
than a fixed dollar amount.

TAX NOTES STATE, VOLUME 103, MARCH 28, 2022
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/242
®
Electronic
copy
available
https://ssrn.com/abstract=4099830
For more
Tax Notes
Stateat:
content,
please visit www.taxnotes.com.

1365

6

Clarke and Fox:

that treats all the relevant categories of state
spending in 602-covered areas as a single
30
aggregated activity. A state tax cut is offset
indirectly by section 602 funds only if the state has
reduced total spending on section 602 ARPAcovered activities in which the state is using the
funds. Viewed through this lens, the tax provision
looks strictly preferable for states to activity-byactivity MOEs, because it gives states, which we
would expect to have more expertise about local
spending needs and desires, more flexibility to
allocate federal funds as they see fit. That
additional layer of flexibility is broadly akin to the
benefits that cap-and-trade regimes enjoy over
command-and-control ones, with the former
more flexibly allocating an entitlement based on
local conditions, rather than with more central
planning.
A simple numerical example illustrates the
contrast. Suppose that the activities covered by
section 602 are $20 billion of a state’s preexisting
budget and that there are four equally sized
activities within that budget — roads, schools,
healthcare, and police — with $5 billion of state
spending on each. If the state were subject to four
separate MOE provisions, a reduction in state
spending in any of the four areas would result in
the state giving up grant money. The MOE
provisions would be violated whether money
went from schools to healthcare, from schools to a
non-covered activity like corrections, or from
schools to a tax cut. By contrast, the tax provision
requires loss of grant money only if total state
spending on the four activities falls below $20
billion and there was a tax cut without sufficient
organic revenue growth or spending cuts outside
the ARPA areas to cover it. Cases in which the tax
provision would require recoupment of grant
money appear to be a strict subset of those in
which activity-by-activity MOE provisions would
require the equivalent loss of grant money.
Indeed, Treasury’s implementation of the tax
provision appears to give states one final
advantage over activity-by-activity MOE

30

Thus far we have treated an activity or program as self-defining,
but MOEs — for example, in higher education — could be broken down
into smaller activities: a grant for building dorms, professors’ salaries,
etc. Thus, section 602 and the tax provision can be thought of
analogously as an MOE provision for a more aggregated activity than is
usually seen.

© 2022 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.
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provisions: Under section 602, a spending
category only counts toward the maintenance
total if the state uses federal funds in that area.
Suppose that, absent the section 602 funds, the
state would like to increase funding of healthcare
to $7 billion, decrease funding of roads to $2
billion, leave the remaining two areas at $5 billion,
and cut taxes by $1 billion. If the state directly
spent the section 602 funds in all four areas, it
might violate the tax provision because its
spending has dipped below $20 billion. By
contrast, if it directs all its section 602 funds into
eligible healthcare uses under section 602 and
continues to spend at least $5 billion on
healthcare, it will not face recoupment under the
tax provision because it has not cut spending
compared with the status quo in its chosen section
602 areas, even if it has cut spending in potential
section 602-eligible areas.
Not all MOE provisions that operated closer
to the level of a state’s budget would necessarily
have the structure of section 602 as implemented
by Treasury. For example, it is possible to imagine
an MOE provision that conditions federal grant
dollars on a state maintaining total revenue or
spending. This provision would present difficult
and interesting tradeoffs when compared with a
set of activity-by-activity MOE provisions. In the
example, for instance, if the state’s total tax
revenue was $30 billion, the state would not have
to give up grant funding under the activity-byactivity MOE provisions if it cut spending in a
non-covered activity like corrections by $2 billion,
and at the same time cut tax revenue from $30
billion to $28 billion. By contrast, if the MOE
provision conditions funding on total revenue or
spending, the state’s actions would require giving
up federal grant money. Under the total spending
MOE, the state would get the freedom to move
spending and grants around that it would not
have under activity-by-activity MOEs. But the
cost to the state would be that it cannot cut
spending in a non-covered activity to cut taxes
without giving up grant money.31
The motivations that apply for an ordinary
MOE provision — a desire to ensure that federal
spending does not supplant state spending in a
31

As discussed below, the State and Local Fiscal Assistant Act of 1972
may present an example that is closer to this hypothetical case.
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single program — can also apply at more general
levels. The federal government may reasonably
wish to encourage state spending in a broader
category such as pandemic response, or even wish
to encourage total spending, as may be especially
desirable during an economic downturn. Or the
government may simply view a state tax cut as a
sign that federal help is less needed.32 In our view,
these differences between ordinary MOE
provisions and ones applying at more general
levels are ones of degree, not kind.
Federal Law and State Taxation in Wider Context
Attaching MOE provisions of matching
requirements to federal spending programs is,
while common, hardly the most salient thing that
the federal government does. But the general
implications of those efforts — encouraging states
to alter or maintain tax and spending policies —
are more common than many observers may
realize. We conclude by briefly discussing two
more general examples of how federal policies
can interact with a state’s incentives in setting its
taxes: the familiar state and local tax deduction
and the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act.
Federal law has long allowed taxpayers to
reduce their federal tax bills by deducting a
portion of their income that they pay in taxes to
state and local governments — an amount
recently (and somewhat controversially) capped
at $10,000 by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act.33 Most
Americans pay less than the cap in state and local
taxes — an average of $8,500 in 2017 — and, that
same year, about half of all states had average
individual state and local tax deductions that
34
were below the $10,000 cap.
Because the SALT deduction reduces the
burden of state and local taxes on taxpayers, it
provides an effective subsidy for states and
localities to increase their taxes — a subsidy,
moreover, that varies in its attractiveness from
state to state. If a state cuts its income tax by $1,
less than $1 will end up in the bank account of
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many of its citizens, because those citizens would
be paying more in federal taxes after the
concomitant reduction in their SALT deductions.
The state would be giving up a portion of the
subsidy implicit in the SALT deduction.35 When
the federal government capped the deduction in
2017, it diminished the size of that effective
subsidy, though it still varies substantially by
state. Increasing the cap — a proposal to increase
36
the cap to $80,000 has been in the news — would
increase the subsidy. The deduction and these
potential changes amount to a substantial and
costly federal subsidy for the states. In 2019 the
Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that
repealing the SALT deduction cap — and
returning to the prior, long-standing system in
which state and local taxes were fully deductible
— would cost the federal government more than
37
$77 billion in annual revenue.
The constitutionality of the SALT cap, like the
constitutionality of section 602, has also been
challenged, with the states of New York,
Connecticut, Maryland, and New Jersey suing to
enjoin its enforcement on constitutional grounds.
Both the Southern District of New York and the
Second Circuit found the claim meritless.38 But the
point we hope to emphasize is independent of the
merits of that suit: Regardless of what deduction
regime is used, any deduction regime affects the
states’ incentive and ability to raise or lower taxes.
A second example of the interplay between
federal funds and state taxes is the State and Local
Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, which created a
long-standing system of revenue sharing between
the federal government and state and local
governments. The idea for this revenue sharing
program was hatched in the 1960s by economist
Walter Heller, signed into law by President Nixon,
and extended in 1976, 1980 and 1983, before

35

Similarly, state bonds will need to be paid back in the future by
state taxes. If a state reduces its borrowing, which would otherwise fund
capital projects, it likewise both reduces its future tax commitments and
gives up a substantial federal subsidy through the exclusion of state
bond interest in the federal income tax.
36

32

Or from a different angle, the federal government may conclude
that its spending is supplanting rather than supplementing state
government activity.
33

Pub. L. 115-97.

34

See Congressional Research Service (CRS), “The SALT Cap:
Overview and Analysis,” R46246 (Mar. 6, 2020).

See Kate Dore, “House Democrats Pass Spending Package With
$80,000 SALT Cap Through 2030,” CNBC, Nov. 19, 2021.
37

See Staff of the Joint Commission on Taxation, “Background on the
Itemized Deduction for State and Local Taxes,” JCX-35-19, at 14 (June 24,
2019).
38

See State of New York v. Mnuchin, 408 F. Supp. 3d 399, 416 (S.D.N.Y.
2019), aff’d sub nom. New York v. Yellen, 15 F.4th 569 (2d Cir. 2021).
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finally expiring in 1986. The act and its
extensions contemplated the federal government
sharing revenue with the states with few strings
attached. Section 103(a) of the original act, for
instance, required only that the funds be used for
“priority expenditures,” including the “ordinary
and necessary maintenance and operating
expenses” of government services.
While the act occasionally arises in
discussions of fiscal federalism, it is less
commonly remembered that its allocation
formula disbursed funds based in part on a local
jurisdiction’s “tax effort,” which the law defined
as a ratio of state tax revenue to state income.
States that raised more revenue from the same
ability to pay — and thus displayed a greater tax
effort — received a greater share of federal
revenue. This allocation scheme had a policy goal
like what the policymakers have for a standard
MOE provision: to allocate federal funds without
displacing the states’ own taxing and spending
efforts. In his message to Congress on revenue
sharing, President Nixon declared that “the
revenue effort adjustment is designed to provide
the States with some incentive to maintain (and
even expand) their efforts to use their own tax
40
resources to meet their needs.”
Like the SALT deduction cap and section 602
of ARPA, the revenue sharing program was not
without controversy, and aspects of the act’s
implementation were challenged in court.41 But
everyone understood that a state cutting its taxes
resulted in a reduction in federal grants under the
act, and we have found no argument that the law
exceeded Congress’s constitutional authority
under the spending clause. The magnitude of the
1972 act and the revenue sharing program that
followed is also roughly comparable to the size of

© 2022 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.

PRACTICE & ANALYSIS

the ARPA funds. The 1972 act distributed more
than $30 billion in 1972 dollars — or about $200
42
billion in 2022 dollars. Over all the years it was in
place, the revenue sharing program distributed
more than $400 billion (in 2022 dollars) to states
and localities; the ARPA provisions creating the
state and local funds appropriate a total of $350
billion.43
Conclusion
The purpose of this article is to put ARPA’s tax
provision in context. Viewing it as an MOE
provision that sits at a level higher than a single
activity, we think, helps clarify what it gives states
and what, if anything, it takes away. It is not
unusual for states to give up federal grants or
subsidies when they cut taxes — an observation
that may be helpful in thinking more generally
about whether ARPA’s tax provision is consonant
with the spending clause.


39

See CRS, supra note 34.

40

Hearings on S. 2483 and S. 2048 Before the Subcommittee on
Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate Committee on Government
Operations, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 155 (1969). Some of these issues are
discussed in James L. Maxwell, “Tax Effort as a Determinant of Revenue
Sharing Allotments,” 11 Harv. J. on Legis. 63 (1973). In particular, see
footnote 11 of that paper.
41

See, e.g., Board of Supervisors of Henrico County, Virginia v. Miller, 625
F.2d 1137 (4th Cir. 1980) (rejecting a challenge to the treasury’s method of
calculating adjusted taxes under the act); Council of and for the Blind of
Delaware County Valley Inc. v. Regan, 709 F.2d 1521, 1523 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(en banc) (rejecting a variety of challenges to the administration of the
act).

42

CRS, “General Revenue Sharing: Background and Analysis,”
RL31936, at 2 (Jan. 9, 2009).
43

See 42 U.S.C. sections 802(a)(1), 803(a)(1).
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